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Abstract 
 
Taking a coordinated, holistic approach to the governance of coastal ecosystems is widely 
advocated in recognition of the need to manage ecosystems as a whole. Despite commitment 
to approaches such as integrated coastal zone management and ecosystem-based management 
of fisheries, governance remains fragmented, with sectors such as environment, fisheries and 
forestry maintaining separate systems of governance from the national to village level. These 
systems include the formation of separate community-based structures, reporting directly to 
the respective sectoral ministry. This raises questions about how this collaborative governance 
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approach aligns with taking a more integrated, holistic approach to management. The paper 
draws on findings from research in Kenya and Zanzibar-Tanzania in coastal villages where 
forest and fisheries management groups have been formed. The research found that the groups 
operate in compartmentalised ‘silos’, in contrast to the interrelated ecosystems on which they 
depend, with little coordination of plans and priorities. In addition, these groups are not 
consistent in their relationship to local government, answering directly to the sectoral ministry 
rather than democratic local government, raising issues for accountability and sustainability. 
These dual challenges of a sectoral-focus and long-term sustainability must be addressed for 
management of ecosystems to be integrated and effective. 
 
Keywords: Integrated coastal zone management; Collaborative natural resource governance; 
Community-based natural resource management 
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INTRODUCTION 
Coastal ecosystems are diverse in composition, with habitats including coral reefs, mangrove 
forests and seagrass meadows (Burke et al. 2001). The complex composition of coastal 
ecosystems makes coastal areas attractive to a diverse range of species, including humans, with 
the result that coastal areas are under severe threat, particularly from human activity (Agardy 
and Alder 2005). Integrated approaches to the management of coastal ecosystems have long 
been advocated, responding to the diversity of habitats within coastal areas and of threats to 
their integrity. Such integrated approaches have particularly been articulated as integrated 
coastal zone management (ICZM) and ecosystem-based management (EBM) (Pittman and 
Armitage 2016). Despite widespread commitment to such approaches since the 1970s (Taljaard 
et al. 2012), effective and sustainable implementation has experienced a number of challenges. 
One of these challenges is sector-led management, with Taljaard et al. (2012: 40) observing 
that ‘the governance systems within which ICM is applied have remained sector-based’ and 
Sale et al. (2014: 12) suggesting that this sector-led approach has resulted in ‘piecemeal’ 
management. Whilst coastal areas have a strong case for seeking a more integrated, joined-up 
approach between sectors, it seems that this has been challenging to achieve (Mangora 2011).  
 
This sector-led approach to managing habitats and activities such as land-use planning and 
fisheries within coastal areas is found from the national to the local level, with ministries or 
government departments responsible for the environment, forests and fisheries forming part of 
the governance system of coastal areas. In many countries, this sector-led approach is reflected 
in the formation of separate community-based structures, created to work with a particular 
ministry or department through collaborative governance. The formation of such groups has 
resulted in there being multiple structures involved in natural resource governance in any one 
location, often working in parallel to local government (Larson and Soto 2008). There is, 
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however, very little analysis and reflection available on how structures formed at the local level 
operate within the same geographical, institutional and social space and what the sector-led 
approach means for delivering on more coordinated or integrated management. The purpose of 
this paper is to answer the following questions that address this gap: how do sector-based 
groups at the village level formed for natural resource management relate to each other and 
what can be learnt from their experience for integrated management?  
 
The questions are addressed through analysis of data on the types, remits and activities of local 
structures in two coastal villages, in Kenya and Zanzibar-Tanzania. The focus of the 
investigation is on the fisheries and forest sectors, as these sectors dominate natural resource 
governance in the coastal areas, and on how they interrelate at the village level. It is concluded 
that the creation of sector-focused community-based structures, operating on the fringes of 
local government, further embeds the challenges of a sectoral approach to the governance of 
coastal ecosystems. In addition to these challenges, the long-term sustainability of these groups, 
particularly in terms of maintaining their existence after donor project funding, is questionable. 
Policy and action are needed that address these dual challenges of a sectoral-focus and the 
potential for long-term sustainability if an effective integrated approach to management is to 
be achieved.  
 
SECTOR-LED COLLABORATIVE MANAGEMENT IN COASTAL AREAS 
Implementation of ICZM and EBM has been described as ‘slow and problematic’ (Alexander 
and Haward 2019: 33), with the sectoral focus dominant in habitat management within coastal 
areas identified as a major barrier to sustainability and effectiveness (Alexander and Haward 
2019; Powell et al. 2009). The existence of separate sectors leads to fragmented decision-
making, inadequate communication and confusion over areas of jurisdiction, with participation 
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and exclusion of stakeholders also presenting a challenge (Alexander and Haward 2019). These 
challenges occur at all levels of decision-making, with fragmentation of decision-making 
occurring within levels (horizontal fragmentation) and between levels (vertical fragmentation) 
(Powell et al. 2009).  
 
To overcome fragmentation and inadequate communication, some form or degree of 
cooperation and coordination is needed. Co-operation has been described as ‘the process by 
which agencies operate together and are coordinated to one end’ (Stojanovic 2004: 285) and 
coordination in a policy context as the avoidance, reduction, counterbalance or outweighing of 
‘adverse consequences’ of one decision on other decisions (Lindblom 1965). Peters (2013: 
570) identifies several barriers to policy coordination, including how policy is understood by 
different professions within the public sector, a desire to maintain an area of work (‘turf 
battles’) and ‘information hoarding’. In responding to these barriers, Peters (2013) suggests 
that policy coordination could be improved by addressing how problems are framed, utilising 
networks of actors involved in the policy areas to facilitate coordination and identifying 
individuals who could connect organisations, referred to as ‘boundary spanners’.  
 
The sectoral focus of natural resource governance dominant within coastal areas is found from 
the national to the local, often village, level. At the local level, it is particularly illustrated by 
the creation of sector-specific community-based structures resulting from the adoption of 
collaborative natural resource management. This approach has become the norm in low-income 
countries since the 1980s, following a wider shift in governance through the formation of 
decentralised government and belief that the inclusion of resource users in management would 
improve compliance with regulations (Larson and Soto 2008; Berkes 2009). Collaborative 
governance has been adopted in forestry, fisheries, wildlife, water, coastal and marine 
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resources (Ribot 2003; Berkes 2009; Ribot et al. 2010; Evans et al. 2011b). Such approaches 
involve the formation of local groups or committees (Larson and Soto 2008), with the initiative 
led, often with support of donor agencies, by the government department or ministry 
concerned. In this way, the forest department or ministry leads in the formation of forest 
management committees, departments of fisheries lead in the formation of fisheries 
management committees and the environment department or wildlife management department 
may lead in the formation of coastal conservation committees. Alternatively, committees or 
groups may be formed outside the government system through donor-funded projects, often 
with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) facilitating the formation process (Ece et al. 
2017).  
 
This sectoral emphasis on the formation of user groups in community-based or collaborative 
management has led, according to Larson and Soto (2008: 225), to a ‘proliferation of user 
groups and stakeholder committees’ inspired by project funding rather than community 
enthusiasm for conservation. The proliferation of community structures reflects the wider 
proliferation of groups and committees at the local level, such as those formed to encourage 
savings and credit, health promotion, education and management of water supplies, often 
initiated by line ministries supported by donor projects (Manor 2004). The formation of natural 
resource management groups outside local government has raised concerns about the 
implications for accountability and democracy. Externally funded user groups are often elite-
captured and may assume roles and responsibilities that would be expected to lie with elected 
local government. They are often unaccountable to the community, at least while project 
funding is available, thereby creating confusion through lack of transparency and 
accountability, and having overlapping functions and responsibilities with other structures. 
However, Larson and Soto (2008) also report on evidence that user groups can be more 
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effective at downward accountability than local government, thereby promoting democracy at 
the local level. 
 
Within and beyond natural resource management, Manor (2004) provides one of very few 
analyses on the existence and implications of there being a plethora of user committees. He 
observes that such committees are usually formed through the support and initiative of donor-
funded projects; they are mostly single-purpose; members are selected through less-reliably 
democratic means than local government structures; and, they often have a limited lifespan, 
which may reduce the potential for engagement of many stakeholders, particularly those who 
are marginalised. Whilst Manor (2004) notes benefits from the formation of user committees, 
such as providing community members with a mechanism through which to engage with 
policy- and decision-making, he highlights the separation of user committees from 
democratically elected local councils as being a significant challenge. This separation results 
from line ministries preferring the user committees to be outside of local council control, with 
Manor arguing that such an arrangement ‘creates a discontinuity between general-purpose local 
councils and single-purpose user committees’ (2004, 201). The top-down control of line 
ministries is maintained by this separation, creating confusion over remits and roles. This view 
is echoed in literature on community-based forest management, with Ece et al. (2017) 
observing that elected representatives to local government are side-lined in forest management, 
undermining their authority and bringing into question the democratic credentials of 
participatory forest management.  
 
From this review of literature, the following three areas were identified as critical to answering 
the research questions: the policy context of coastal ecosystems and how integration is 
envisaged; the remit of each type of village-level natural resource management group and how 
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these groups interact with different levels and parts of government; and, how village-level 
natural resource groups interact with each other. 
 
METHODS 
The choice of Kenya and Zanzibar as study sites was motivated by their substantial experience 
in collaborative natural resource management arrangements, though with different legislative 
backgrounds. Both countries have adopted collaborative approaches in marine management 
(Cinner et al. 2012) and are neighbouring countries with similar fisheries and forests. Kenya 
has a multitude of systems within the governance of coastal areas (Evans et al. 2011a) though 
has only relatively recently introduced community involvement in forest management through 
legislation in 2005. The approach gained momentum with wider decentralisation of 
government functions after the adoption of a new Constitution in 2010 (Chomba et al. 2015). 
Zanzibar has a longer tradition of community involvement in forest management and became 
one of the pilot sites for REDD+ initiatives in Tanzania (Sills et al. 2014; Sutta and Silayo 
2014). The fisheries sector has also seen an evolution of community-based fisheries 
management through the establishment of Shehia Fisheries Committees (SFC) sanctioned by 
the Department of Fisheries Development through a number of donor funded capacity 
development projects (Levine 2007, 2016). The emergence and spread of these community-
based structures for different natural resource areas and types, such as forests, fisheries and 
other coastal ecosystems, means that these locations are affected by multiple government 
policies and legislation. 
 
The villages of Vanga in Kenya and Uzi in Zanzibar are locations where mangrove forests 
remain important features of the seascape and are integral to livelihoods, in terms of support to 
fisheries as well as provision of timber and fuelwood. The villages are representative of many 
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coastal villages in these countries, with the communities highly dependent on fisheries and 
mangrove forests and accordingly they attract efforts to improve natural resource management 
by both government and NGOs. The cases of these villages and of Kenya and Zanzibar are 
representative of other low-income countries where sector-led donor funded projects have led 
to the formation of multiple user groups, as evidenced in the review of literature.  
 
Data was collected between 2014 and 2016 from the two communities as part of a larger 
research project on the governance arrangements of coastal ecosystems. Collection of data was 
undertaken through key informant interviews and focus group discussions with purposively 
selected community members based on their knowledge and involvement in local resource 
governance and influence in community decision-making structures. Topic checklists were 
used to guide discussion, with questions seeking to identify and understand structures involved 
in coastal ecosystem management, interactions between structures and challenges experienced 
in management. Table 1 sets out the data collection methods and sample sizes and 
characteristics for Vanga and Uzi.  
 
<TABLE 1 HERE> 
 
Vanga is located close to the Kenya-Tanzania border, has a considerable mangrove forest, a 
population of 13,546 in 2010 and the community is heavily dependent on fisheries with 
artisanal fishing contributing to more than 80% of the local economy, inclusive of other 
fisheries related activities such as boat making and fish vending (Ochiewo 2004). The village 
is not within easy reach of a market for timber or charcoal and so pressure on the mangrove 
forest is not excessive. Natural resources in Vanga include fisheries, mangroves, terrestrial 
coastal forests, coral reefs and sea grass beds. Access to the resources is regulated through local 
10 
 
 
 
governance structures stipulated in the Forest Act (2005) for forest related resources and the 
Fisheries Management and Development Act (2016) for fisheries and associated marine 
resources.  Uzi is located on Unguja island of Zanzibar, Tanzania, at the end of a causeway, 
meaning that access is not always possible as the road is impassable at times, and is within the 
Menai Bay Conservation Area (MBCA). It had a population of 1801 in 2012 and the main 
livelihood and economic activities are seaweed farming, crop cultivation, livestock keeping 
and fishing. 
 
Ethical approval for the research was granted through the formal ethical review process of the 
University of Birmingham, UK, which required details on intended participants, how 
recruitment of participants would take place and how informed consent would be sought. The 
data collection tools were also submitted as part of the review process. Consent confirming 
willingness to engage in the research process and for the data to be analysed and reported on 
was sought from all respondents once the purpose of the research and how the data will be used 
was explained. Verbal consent was sought as this was more culturally acceptable than written 
consent. Transcripts of the interviews and focus group discussions were analysed by coding for 
themes identified in relation to the issues raised in the literature review. The key themes 
identified for coding included: roles and responsibilities in resource governance (control of 
access to resources, resource monitoring and surveillance, wider community involvement and 
convening of meetings, resource restoration and rehabilitation, resolution of conflicts, rule 
enforcement and monitoring of illegal activity) and level of acceptance of local governance 
structures by the community, inter-sectoral engagement and collaboration at local level 
(complementarity of mandates, level of consultation). Legislation and policy documents were 
also consulted. These are referred to in the findings section. 
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FINDINGS 
 
Vanga, Kenya 
 
Policy context 
Integrated approaches to the management of coastal ecosystems are seen in the Integrated 
Coastal Zone Management policy of 2015, and earlier ICZM policies and plans, and reference 
to EBM in the 2008 National Oceans and Fisheries Policy. The ICZM policy repeatedly refers 
to the sectoral approach to policy and practice having a negative effect on the coast, referring 
to ‘uncoordinated sectoral policies’ and stating that ‘sectoral management approaches have 
failed to achieve the objectives of coastal planning and sustainable development’ (MEWNR 
2015: 1). Responding to this recognition, the first objective of the policy is to ‘promote 
integrated planning and coordination of coastal developments across the various sectors’ and 
one of the nine guiding principles is the ‘use of ecosystem-based approach that recognises the 
relationships and inter-linkages between all components of the wider ecosystem in addressing 
coastal zone management issues’ (MEWNR 2015: 19). The multiple components of the 
implementation plan include references to integrating plans with other planning processes (e.g. 
land use planning), improving communication and coordination and securing the support and 
involvement of relevant sectors. These references suggest recognition of the need to consider 
how to adopt an integrated approach in many areas of activity but do not give a strong sense of 
how that will happen in practice. 
 
The primary goal of the National Oceans and Fisheries Policy is concerned with increasing fish 
production and utilization, though the goal also notes that this should be sustainable. The policy 
includes the adoption of an ‘ecosystems approach’ to management as one of eight principles. 
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There are no detailed guidelines or evidence of what an ecosystems approach to management 
would look like in practice within fisheries. The 2017 National Mangrove Ecosystem 
Management Plan also recognises the challenges resulting from a sectoral approach, stating 
that ‘one of the major challenges facing the management of resources at the coast is the sectoral 
governance system which does not recognize the interconnectedness of ecosystems in resource 
management’ (GoK 2017: 21).  
 
The 2015 ICZM policy lists and summarizes 21 policies from a range of sectors, from the 
Constitution to the draft tourism policy. This illustrates the diverse range and number of 
relevant sectors, policies and legislation for coastal governance. This has been observed in 
literature, with Samoilys et al. (2011) identifying 48 pieces of legislation from 14 Ministries 
associated with conservation in coastal areas. Evans et al. (2011a: 2) describe the governance 
of Kenya’s coastal zone as ‘a patchwork of approaches including customary management, 
hierarchical governance, and integrated coastal zone management; management tools including 
marine protected areas, customary gear restrictions, fisheries regulations, licensing, and 
environmental impact assessment; and initiatives including infrastructure development, 
investment in fishing technologies, ecotourism ventures, and others’. Since then, the 
decentralization of government through the formation of the County system has added further 
structures, policies and reporting requirements, with County governments employing officers 
in areas including fisheries, wildlife, forestry and land-use planning. 
 
Despite the plethora of policies and legislation, there is consistency within policy and 
legislation in support of ecosystem-based management and community participation in 
management, as shown in Table 2.  
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<TABLE 2 HERE> 
 
Structures and remit of village-level groups  
The policy context set out above suggests a move towards coordination and cooperation, 
though the National Mangrove Ecosystem Management Plan was not in place at the time of 
data collection. In Vanga, however, it was found that community-based structures remain 
sector-focused, with little interaction and coordination between groups.  
 
Participatory approaches to governance have been adopted in many natural resource sectors in 
Kenya. In forestry, the Forest Act of 2005 allowed for the formation of Community Forest 
Associations (CFAs) to work with the Government’s Kenya Forest Service (KFS) and, in 
fisheries, the Fisheries (Beach Management Unit) Regulations 2007 requires the formation of 
community-based Beach Management Units (BMUs) to collaborate with the State Department 
of Fisheries (SDF) in managing fisheries resources. Several other types of community-based 
organizations have been formed to work with government in Marine Conservation Areas, with 
structures associated with Community Conservation Areas (CCAs) and Locally Managed 
Marine Areas (LMMAs). These have different legal foundations, though most are founded on 
either forestry or fisheries legislation (Kawaka et al. 2017). 
 
The main structures concerned with governing natural resources in Vanga are the CFA and 
BMUs, as shown in Table 3, which sets out the structures, mandate, responsibility, authority 
and level of interaction. The VAJIKI (named from three villages: Vanga, Jimbo and Kiwegu) 
CFA was registered in 2009 but was not fully operational, as the co-management agreement 
had not been finalised. It therefore worked semi-formally with the KFS, represented at the local 
(village) level by a Forest Guard. The CFA is comprised of four user groups: Mwambiweje 
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Women’s Group and Mwagugu Mariculture, which are in Vanga village; Jimbo Environmental 
Group in Jimbo village; and, Vumilia Nguvu Kazi group in Kiwegu village. Delays in signing 
of the agreement were due to lack of adequate finances to see the process through; this delay 
meant that the CFA had little mandate to act in the community as it was not fully recognized 
as a source of power in local mangrove governance. In addition, there were no local rules 
established by the community to protect the mangroves. The operational rules in mangrove 
governance were those from the KFS management plan, which was formerly guided by the 
Forest Act of 2005 but since late 2016 is guided by the Forest Conservation and Management 
Act No. 34, which repealed the 2005 Act. The Act provides the legal mandate for CFAs, but in 
practice the CFA in the Vanga area was not very active and only made progress in its activity 
with the development of a participatory forest management plan for a pilot mangrove area 
designated for mangrove carbon credits, which was approved by KFS, when assisted by an 
external agency.  
 
The CFA reports to the Forest Guard in charge of the mangrove area at the local level; however, 
no formal reporting mechanism such as quarterly or annual reports or formal assessment by the 
Forest Guard have been developed. The functions of the Forest Guard and that of the CFA 
seemed to be carried out in isolation with little coordination between the two; for example, the 
CFA was hardly aware of the activities carried out by the Forest Guard at a particular time and 
would mostly liaise with the Forest Guard when there were cases of illegal harvesting or 
conflict resolution. Flow of information from the national and regional to the local governance 
systems was mostly down the hierarchy, rather than up. Legislation from the national level 
governed interactions between the regional and local governance levels with limited input from 
the local level. KFS maintains overall control of management of forests and all management 
plans developed down the hierarchy must be approved by KFS.  It is envisaged that with the 
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signing of the co-management agreement between the CFA and KFS, the CFA will have a level 
of autonomy in decision making, monitoring and issuing of sanctions  at the  local level, such 
that community groups that would like to carry out activities in the mangrove forest would 
have to register with the CFA to gain access to the resource.  
 
<TABLE 3 HERE> 
 
There are two Beach Management Units (Vanga BMU and Jimbo BMU) in the area working 
in co-management with the SDF, which has the national mandate for fisheries management.  
The BMUs enjoy more autonomy compared to the CFA. They are more established and have 
developed by-laws for local management of the fisheries, which were still under the operational 
framework regulated under the BMU Regulations of 2007, which was formerly governed under 
the Fisheries Act Cap 378 of 1989 (revised in 2012) but was later under the Fisheries 
Management and Development Act of 2016. The BMUs are allowed to exclusively manage the 
fish landing sites in the area and are responsible for providing catch data to the SDF.  The 
BMUs, however, lack adequate capacity and financial resources to carry out monitoring and 
surveillance of illegal fishing activities. There were no Community Conservation Areas in 
operation but there were initial attempts at developing structures to establish the CCAs through 
proposals by the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) Flora & Fauna International and 
East African Wildlife Society.  
 
KFS has the overall mandate in managing the forest while the SDF is responsible for all the 
fisheries resources in the area including those in mangrove areas. Other Government parastatals 
such as Kenya Marine and Fisheries Research Institute (KMFRI) and Kenya Wildlife Services 
(KWS) have complimentary roles particularly related to protection of the mangrove and 
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associated ecosystems to promote the sustainability of fisheries and wildlife resources in the 
area.  Policy and practice associated with these agencies therefore has pertinence in the coastal 
area and affect local governance, for example KMFRI was instrumental in providing technical 
support to the community for development of a mangrove management plan for the area 
designated for mangrove carbon credits. 
 
Interaction at the local level 
While the need and support for ecosystem-based management and community involvement in 
management of resources is strongly emphasized in policy and legislation documents, the 
delivery on this in practice is still largely inadequate at national level and much less at the local 
level.  This was evidenced by the lack of joint activities implemented by fisheries and forestry 
sector that demonstrate ecosystem-based management approaches for coastal resources 
management, such as joint monitoring and surveillance of resources in the area and coordinated 
issuance of permits for access to the resources. One sector was hardly aware of the monitoring 
schedules of the other sector despite working in the same areas. There was limited sharing of 
resources such as boats for monitoring and surveillance across the sectors. The poor 
coordination from the sectors cascaded down to the local level structures that are linked to the 
various sectors. 
 
Interaction between the CFA and BMUs was not regular or planned for; interaction tends to 
result from funded activities, particularly mangrove planting, discussion to resolve an issue and 
representation by the same individuals on the committees, for example the vice chairperson of 
the VAJIKI CFA was also the Chairperson of the Jimbo BMU. It was consistently reported that 
groups do not collaborate much, rather each focuses on their own activities. Therefore, despite 
the somewhat similar representation by the same individuals across the groups, there was a 
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lack of coherence in activities performed by the groups, which could lead to overlapping and 
duplication of activities. Participation of individuals in multiple groups was driven by the 
expectation of benefits such as attending training and managing finances of the groups. One 
example of interaction to resolve an issue involved the CFA and BMU meeting to discuss the 
activities of the licensed timber cutter. The cutter was licensed by the KFS but community 
members believed that he was over- and indiscriminately harvesting mangrove trees. Through 
the joint resolution of the groups, they were able to expel him from the area. 
 
The separate mandates for each group were clearly seen by respondents at the community level 
to be associated with separate government departments. Each government department has 
empowered its own resource user group and believes that their group has the overall power at 
the local level with regard to relevant natural resources. It was suggested by one respondent 
that ‘fisheries says that BMU is the overall…KWS [Kenya Wildlife Service] they tell you that 
they are the ones who are overall. When you come to the CFA, the forest department says they 
are the overall so there is some conflict at some point’ (CFA FGD 13 June 2015). The lack of 
connectivity between the sectors at the national level flows down the hierarchy to the local 
level resulting in poor coordination of local management activities.  
 
Donors and NGOs play a significant role in spearheading the establishment of local resource 
governance structures through providing funding for activities such as mobilizing the 
community, building capacity and development of management plans (Cinner et al. 2012). 
Each group may have different sources of funding from different donors, yet these are 
supporting similar activities being carried out in the same area by a number of local groups but 
at different times. Donors often work directly with the local groups with minimal contact with 
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the government institutions that have overall mandate of the resource thus at times resulting in 
conflict as the institutions feel by-passed.  
 
Perceptions of the wider community on the local governance of natural resources was generally 
positive due to the fact that there was an improvement in enforcement of rules and regulation, 
control of access to resources and monitoring and surveillance in the past five years. However, 
the lack of adequate consultation with the community on their needs and priorities and poor 
incorporation of the same in planning was highlighted as a major challenge affecting 
community participation and cooperation.  This led to aspects of distrust and suspicion among 
some community members who felt excluded in the establishment of the co-management 
structures yet were expected to comply with the structures once established.  
 
Uzi, Zanzibar-Tanzania 
 
Policy context 
The development and implementation of an integrated approach to coastal zone management 
has long been a commitment in Zanzibar. Between 2005 and 2013, the World Bank-funded 
Marine and Coastal Environmental Management Project (MACEMP) was implemented, which 
aimed to improve the management of marine and coastal resources through improving 
institutional arrangements and revenue generation and the formation of networks of Marine 
Protected Areas (MPAs). An objective of MACEMP was to establish and support a 
comprehensive system of Marine Management Areas (MMAs) in the territorial sea built on an 
Integrated Coastal Management strategy (Marine Conservation Unit 2012). A major form of 
the MMAs is the Marine Conservation Areas(MCA), which refers to large areas that are under 
management for sustainable utilization (Department of Fisheries and Marine Resources 2009). 
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While there is no defined model for an MCA, they typically include restricted areas where fish 
stocks can recover and multiple use areas where human activities are allowed, as long as they 
are compatible with sustainable exploitation. 
 
The 2014 draft fisheries policy refers to ecosystems but does not explicitly commit to EBM. 
Instead, there is great attention to MCAs, reflecting the longer tradition of adopting a 
conservation focus to coastal ecosystem management in Zanzibar, driven by the primary 
dependence on coastal and marine resources for the local economy. The draft policy does refer 
though to the ‘lack of effectiveness of public initiatives aimed at preserving the integrity of 
coastal ecosystems’, including ICZM (The Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar 2014: 7). 
Table 4 summarizes key policy and legislation relevant to the coastal areas with attention to 
community involvement and integrated approaches.  
 
<TABLE 4 HERE> 
 
Structures and remits of village-level groups 
Despite the long commitment to an ecosystem-based approach through marine conservation, 
community-based structures are sector-specific and focused. Community-based natural 
resource management approaches have been in existence in Zanzibar since the 1980s. 
Revisions of the policy and legislative frameworks of the forestry, fisheries and environment 
sectors in the 1990s led to recognition and mainstreaming of participatory approaches and a 
clearer remit for natural resource conservation strategies and plans. Within the forestry sector, 
Community Forest Management Areas, supported by management agreements (CoFMAs), 
have been formed, whereas in the fisheries sector, Shehia (or village) Fisheries Committees 
(SFCs) have legal remit under the Marine Conservation Unit (MCU) regulations of the 2010 
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Fisheries Act No. 7. SFCs are therefore associated with MCA where they exist and the 
committee reports to the MCA Fishermen’s Executive Committee, made up of the chairpersons 
of each SFC. The Executive Committee is required to work with the Shehia’s Executive 
Committees and the MCU Advisory Council. The formation of CoFMAs was led by a 
Norwegian-funded project through CARE International called HIMA (Hifadhi ya Misitu ya 
Asili - ‘conservation of natural forests’), which began in 2010 as a REDD+ pilot project, with 
objectives and remit influenced by the project, leading to little space or opportunity for 
community members to influence the purpose, activities or design of CoFMAs (Benjaminsen 
2014; Eilola et al. 2015). 
 
The 2015 Environment Act allowed for the introduction of Integrated Coastal Zone 
Management (ICZM), led by the Department of Environment (DoE). One of the initiatives 
under the recent ICZM push is the formation of ICZM committees at the community level, 
drawing on members of the other committees, including forest conservation, fisheries and 
environment. However, the formation of ICZM committees has been slow and inconsistent, 
due to unpredictable financial resources from donor-funded projects. While these could have 
provided an opportunity for information sharing and joint working across the sector-based 
groups, the persistent fragmentation at the higher departmental level threatens the local level 
opportunities for collaboration (Nchimbi 2018). 
 
The village of Uzi has a CoFMA and a SFC, as shown in Table 5, which sets out the structures, 
mandate, responsibility, authority and level of interaction. The CoFMA reports to the Sheha 
(Village Head) and submits minutes of meetings to an umbrella NGO, Jumuiya ya Uhifadhi 
Misitu ya Jamii Zanzibar (JUMIJAZA), through another NGO, Jozani Environmental 
Conservation Association (JECA). Formation of JUMIJAZA came as an exit strategy of the 
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HIMA project, serving as an association of CoFMAs, attached to the Department of Forest and 
Non-renewable Natural Resources (DFNR) and, at times, donor project funding has been 
distributed through the NGO. It was reported that whilst the mangrove forest is in good 
condition, there is some deforestation and degradation. Villagers perceive the CoFMA to have 
strict rules, particularly in banning charcoal-making. The CoFMA is also known for its 
constructive approach to conflict resolution, having participated in a process to resolve conflict 
with a neighbouring Shehia on illegal mangrove cutting. However, few people in the village 
are involved in CoFMA activities beyond the committee and there is some resentment towards 
the strict regulations. Following the closure HIMA project, facilitation of the formation of 
CoFMAs was assumed by DFNR, but with decreased flow of resources, there has been a lack 
of consistency and sustainability in support to CoFMAs. 
 
<TABLE 5 HERE> 
 
The SFC reports to the Sheha and to the MBCA, in line with fisheries committees being under 
the remit of MCU. The committee reported to undertake patrols, have regular elections and 
collect fees from temporary fishing camps. The camps are set up for a period of three months 
and each fisherman at the camp pays a fee for staying there, which goes to the Village 
Development Committee. The timing of the elections is determined by the MBCA and the 
committee reported that they do not have their own by-laws, but operate within the remit of the 
MBCA regulations. The committee is, then, very dependent on activities being driven by the 
MBCA rather than the local community, leading to perceptions as they are yet another extended 
form of the government policing of fisheries resources. This reflects Shinn’s (2015) findings 
in Zanzibar, that fisheries village committees are heavily influenced by government officers 
and do not really have any power.  
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The functioning and activities of SFCs was very dependent on the objectives and activities of 
MACEMP. The MBCA had been formed prior to the start of MACEMP, with support from the 
WorldWide Fund for Nature (WWF), with the MBCA issuing regulations that control fishing 
within the area. Since the closure of MACEMP, few resources have been made available to 
SFCs to support patrols or other activities and, as noted by Levine (2016: 1285), ‘community 
capacity for co-management is still considered to be low’. Levine (2016) attributes this not 
only to the lack of resources available to SFCs, but also to the hierarchical system of 
governance in Zanzibar, with Sheha having strong authority at the village level and reporting 
upwards and concludes ‘it remained challenging for fishermen to even conceive of local 
institutions that could participate in co-management without strong direction from a centralized 
authority’ (2016: 1287).  
 
Interaction at the local level 
As the government-led formation of community-based structures directs committees to report 
upwards to authorities, there is little feedback and downward accountability to communities. 
Whilst this does not preclude interaction with other structures at village level, it does not 
encourage interaction and cooperation either. The SFC in Uzi consistently stated that they work 
alone and do not cooperate with anyone at the local level. As stated earlier, they collaborate 
with the MBCA, attending occasional meetings, and with fisheries officers, but are not very 
active in the absence of donor-funded projects and government-issued instructions. They also 
participate in planning processes organised by the Shehia development committee and 
collaborate with neighbouring SFCs when there are cross-border fisheries-related conflicts to 
be resolved. 
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The CoFMA reported much more interaction with a range of actors, including forest officers, 
JUMIJAZA, JECA and other CoFMAs, particularly on issues such as marking boundaries and 
resolving conflict associated with illegal extraction of timber. They also reported limited 
interaction with the SFC, specifically on the issue of patrolling to prevent fishers using poison 
within the mangrove forests. However, these patrols rarely take place, relying on the initiative 
of the MBCA, as neither the SFC or CoFMA own a boat.  
 
What was found then in Uzi is that the forest and fisheries committees remained far apart as 
there is very little formal interaction between structures formed to govern coastal ecosystems, 
though there is independent interaction between each structure and the Sheha, for reporting 
purposes, and with the respective government department. The community-based structures 
largely operate independently of each other despite having potentially common remits and 
interests. As at the higher departmental level, there is no defined forum for an integrated 
conservation arrangement at the Shehia. In other villages in Zanzibar, relations between 
community-based forest and fisheries management structures have been reported as being 
problematic, with little trust and accountability, resulting from top-down initiation and 
reporting (Cinner et al. 2012; Saunders et al. 2008).  
 
DISCUSSION 
The policy context in both countries reflects a move towards emphasis on taking a more 
integrated, ecosystem-based approach to the management of coastal ecosystems at any level. 
There is though greater recognition of the sectoral challenges to coastal ecosystem governance 
in the Kenyan documents than those of Zanzibar, perhaps reflecting the longer tradition of 
engagement of the fisheries sector in Zanzibar in a conservation approach to management 
through MCAs. Despite much recognition of the challenges that a sectoral focus brings in the 
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Kenyan policies, there is as yet little guidance on how a more integrated approach may be taken 
in practice.  
 
In practice, at the time of data collection, there was no evidence of an integrated or ecosystem-
based approach informing the management arrangements, structures or activities. Some 
policies, plans and legislation, such as the National Mangrove Ecosystem Management Plan in 
Kenya and ICZM in the 2015 Environment Act in Zanzibar, were very recent to the time of 
data collection. They had, however, been preceded by ICZM-type policies and plans and so the 
principles of integration and ecosystem-based management have been accepted in both 
countries for many years. The evidence suggests that an integrated or ecosystem-based 
approach has not moved much beyond policy and legislation and supports Alexander and 
Haward’s (2019: 33) observation that implementation of ICZM and EBM is ‘slow and 
problematic’ and that a sectoral focus remains dominant. 
 
The sectoral focus was certainly dominant in both Vanga and Uzi, with local committees and 
groups given mandate by their respective government departments or agencies, with little 
reference to other structures or sectors. Whilst there is limited collaboration with, and reporting 
to local government in both cases, links to sectoral ministries are strong and provide the overall 
policy direction and priorities. In both villages, the fisheries structure has been in place for 
longer and is more established, though the BMU in Kenya appears much better organized and 
stronger, with its clear fisheries remit, than the SFC in Uzi, which is linked to general marine 
conservation rather than being specific to fisheries. This suggests that a strong link to a 
government sector is necessary for structures to have a clear remit and be able to keep going 
over time, despite the potentially greater opportunity of a more integrated approach through 
marine conservation in Zanzibar. 
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Although CFAs in Kenya have legal remit given by the Forest Act 2005 and subsequently the 
Forest Conservation and Management Act 2016, they are not mandatory as BMUs are. The 
formation of the CFA in Vanga was initiated by the community, though the formation process 
requires close collaboration with KFS, particularly because of the requirement that a highly 
technical Participatory Forest Management Plan (PFMP) is developed. Where CFAs have been 
formed, it has been found that little power is actually devolved to the CFA, with valuable 
activities such as licensing remaining with KFS (Mogoi et al. 2012; Chomba et al. 2015). In 
Uzi, a CoFMA had to be developed and this was initiated by the forest department working 
closely with NGOs partnering to implement a REDD+ pilot project (Sills et al., 2014). 
 
All of the community-based structures report to their parent ministry, either directly or through 
the Village Head or NGO. This supports the perception of such structures as part of, or an 
extension of, government sectors. The systems are, then, hierarchical, with local level 
structures dependent on sectoral government officers for instructions, support and, often, 
funding. Central government departments and ministries have maintained power and control 
through the approach they have taken to collaborative management, as found elsewhere 
(Poteete and Ribot 2011).  
 
Although all of the structures are elected, it is not clear how democratic they may be perceived 
to be, or how democratic their remit is. The election processes take place outside of the local 
government system and are driven by the respective government sector department. There was 
a degree of suspicion in both villages that committee members seek office to take advantage of 
the opportunity to attend workshops and receive allowances and to enrich themselves through 
collection of fines and fees. The degree to which this was actually happening was not clear, 
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particularly given that some of the structures, particularly the SFC in Uzi and the CFA in 
Vanga, were not very active, however the perception that this is the motivation for committee 
membership must undermine the authority of these structures. The lack of reporting and 
accountability to the wider community must also undermine the legitimacy of the structures. 
In contrast to Larson and Soto’s (2008) suggestion that elected user groups may be more 
democratic than local government because of their downward accountability, there was a 
distinct lack of accountability to the wider communities in both villages suggesting that the 
groups do not contribute to the practice of democracy in either locations. 
 
In both cases, there is no evidence of planned-for, deliberate and regular coordination and 
communication between local forestry and fisheries structures. Whilst no evidence was found 
of there being ‘adverse consequences’ arising from the lack of coordination, beliefs were 
expressed that the lack of coordination led to duplication of activities, confusion over remit and 
missed opportunities to be more active and effective through pooling resources. Where there 
is interaction between local level structures, this tends to be informal or takes places around 
specific, funded activities and conflict resolution. The barriers to coordination appear to be 
related to the remit that local groups have and which they adhere to, with this remit coming 
from the parent sector to which they are associated. Taking a more integrated approach would 
require going beyond the given remit and would require initiative. Such initiative is not 
encouraged by the top-down, sector-led approach to natural resource governance at all levels. 
 
The lack of adequate coordination between the different local structures and limited 
accountability between the structures minimizes the effectiveness and impact of conservation 
efforts of the groups. While line ministries may offer support to their respective local co-
management structures, improved local interaction would provide a robust network that would 
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strengthen the capacity of local co-management beyond the support offered by state-mandated 
line ministries (Saunders et al. 2008; Agrawal and Gibson 1999). Cinner and McClanahan 
(2015:138) through their study reviewing performance of and attitudes towards BMU on the 
Kenyan Coast propose that considerable positive outcomes can be achieved through co-
management efforts however the process may take time. From the study of Vanga and Uzi 
villages, it is clear that sectoral coordination in the establishment of local co-management 
structures is necessary to ensure there is effectiveness in natural resource management at the 
local level. This approach would promote better accountability at the local level and promote 
a holistic approach to management of resources and mainstreaming of ICZM and EBM in 
planning processes.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
The sector-specific composition, activities and reporting of the forestry and fisheries 
management structures at the local level in Kenya and Zanzibar has resulted in silo-ed 
structures and behaviour. There is a clear lack of interaction and cooperation between 
structures, despite national policy that advocates ICZM in both countries. This reflects Taljaard 
et al. (2012) and Sale et al.’s (2014) findings that ICZM often has to rely on fragmented, 
sectoral structures and management approaches and this results in a piecemeal rather than 
integrated approach, with implications for the quality and nature of outcomes. The lack of 
reference to the remit and function of other structures within the remit of sectoral local groups 
suggests a desire by parent ministries to control the composition and activities of management 
activities that falls within their mandate. The creation of sector-focused community-based 
structures, operating on the fringes of local government, therefore further embeds the 
challenges of a sectoral approach to the governance of coastal ecosystems. 
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This sector-led, top-down approach to the formation of local governance structures has led to 
several challenges for natural resource governance: 1) the committees or groups work 
independently of each other, often with little coordination or cooperation, including with local 
governance structures such as village heads and village councils; 2) the structures are often 
ineffective and fairly inactive when project funding that led to their formation, as is often the 
case, is no longer available; and, 3) the local level structures are seen as part of the government 
sector, awaiting instructions, direction and support, rather than being locally-driven and 
resourced. This sectoral approach semi-bypasses elected local government. This, it is suggested 
by Ece et al. (2017), calls into question its democratic credentials, as questions are raised as to 
who is a representative, where does the remit for representation come from and how can such 
structures be called to account by local people. They go on to advocate for the inclusion of 
democratically elected representatives in forest management in existing formal decentralised 
government as the solution to the sectoral hold on management. There is, though, little evidence 
to date of such an approach taking place from which to learn and so potential implications for 
forest management and associated livelihoods need further investigation. 
 
It is clear though that the long-term sustainability of collaborative structures is related to the 
dependence they have on donor-funded projects. This dependence on donor funding through 
fixed duration projects has several implications for collaborative natural resource governance. 
Firstly, those involved in developing and delivering on the project are under pressure to 
demonstrate outputs and outcomes, which may be in the form of the establishment of new 
groups; it is doubtful that utilising existing structures would look as attractive as the formation 
of new groups. Secondly, once the project finishes, and if no further funds are available, not 
only is support and impetus likely to be greatly reduced, whether from government or NGOs, 
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attention of all or some of those concerned may be diverted to other projects or seeking other 
projects, that may or may not build on the establishment of the community-based structures. 
Thirdly, documents and knowledge associated with the formation of a governance approach 
may, to an extent, be lost with the closure of a project, with staff moving onto other 
employment, potentially in other countries. The findings and analyses of these cases lend 
support to the need for greater consideration to be given to the long-term sustainability of such 
governance systems and structures and to how a more integrated approach could be supported 
through governance structures and systems. Incorporation of a commitment to ecosystem-
based management and ICZM is insufficient on its own; attention must be given to how 
governance structures and systems can be developed and/or encouraged to work more 
collaboratively in a coordinated way, whilst addressing concerns about the democratic basis of 
such structures.  
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Table 1 Data collection methods and samples 
 
Method Vanga Uzi 
Key 
informant 
interviews 
20 interviews: the forest guard, chief of 
the area, the government Fisheries 
Officer, Community Forest Association 
(CFA) chairperson, 6 local leaders of 
Vanga, Jimbo and Kiwegu villages, 6 
leaders from the CFA user groups, 3 
Beach Management Unit (BMU) leaders 
and 1 influential community member.  
Interviews were conducted with 
the Village Leader (Sheha), two 
selected Village Elders (one man 
and one woman), three executive 
committee members (chair, 
secretary, treasurer) of the 
fisheries committee and forest 
management committee. 
Focus group 
discussions 
Separate focus group discussions were 
conducted with the local administrative 
leaders in the area, CFA, BMU, men and 
women from the community. 
Four focus group discussions were 
held with members of the forest 
committee, fisheries committee 
and a sample of non-committee 
members in separate 
representative groups of women 
and men.  
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Table 2 Policies and legislation concerning forestry and fisheries in coastal areas 
of Kenya 
Sector Policy/Act/Plan Provision for community-based and integrated 
management 
Forest Forest Act 2005  Allowed for the formation of Community Forest 
Associations (CFAs) to work with the 
Government’s Kenya Forest Service 
 Forest Conservation 
and Management Act 
No. 34 2016 
 Provides for development and sustainable 
management of forest resources 
 Part 5 confirms mandate to form CFAs, with right 
and responsibilities set out 
 Forest Policy 2014  Includes taking an ‘integrated ecosystem 
approach to conserving and managing forest 
resources’ as one of the guiding principles 
 Confirms commitment to community forest 
management 
Fisheries Fisheries (Beach 
Management Unit) 
Regulations 2007 
 Requires the formation of community-based 
Beach Management Units (BMUs) to collaborate 
with the State Department of Fisheries (SDF) in 
managing fisheries resources  
 National Oceans and 
Fisheries Policy 2008 
 Ecosystem based approach in the management 
of resources will be adopted 
 Role of BMUs to be promoted and capacity built  
38 
 
 
 
Sector Policy/Act/Plan Provision for community-based and integrated 
management 
 The Fisheries 
Management and 
Development Act 
No. 35 2016 
 One of the guiding principles in Section 5 is to 
ensure ‘the effective application of an ecosystem 
approach to fisheries management’ 
 Section 37 allows for the formation of BMUs 
Coastal Integrated Coastal 
Zone Management 
policy 2015 
National Mangrove 
Ecosystem 
Management Plan 
2017 
 Aims to promote coordinated and integrated 
policy and management, and taking an 
ecosystem-based approach to management. 
 
 Commits to an ecosystem-based approach to the 
management of mangroves 
 Advocates for community involvement in 
management through CFAs 
 
Local 
Government 
County Governments 
Act No. 17 2012 
 Allows for the formation of local government in 
the form of County governments 
 Includes protection and development of natural 
resources 
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Table 3 Local natural resource governance structures in Vanga 
 
Sector Mandate Key  Responsibilities Level of Formal Authority Level of Interaction with 
other structures 
Local 
Government  
Village Head; County 
government; sectoral 
officers within County 
government and also 
devolved, reporting 
directly to national 
ministries; Forest 
Guard reports to KFS; 
Fisheries Officer 
reports to SDF. 
 Control access to the resource 
 Enforcement of rules from line 
ministries/ departments 
 Monitoring and surveillance of 
resources 
 Conflict Resolution 
 
Formally mandated as employees of 
line ministries/ departments 
 
Locally recognized as key decision 
makers 
Formal and mostly 
regular interaction with 
the line ministries – 
appointment of local 
officers is done by the line 
ministries and formal 
reporting is carried out by 
officers to the respective 
line ministries. 
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Irregular and mostly 
informal interactions with 
other local structures – no 
formal platform for 
interactions exists. Most 
interactions are 
opportunistic  and donor- 
driven, for example 
through capacity building 
workshops organized by 
NGOs for stakeholders 
from different sectors. 
Forestry Community Forest 
Associations (CFA) 
established under the 
Forest Act of 2005. 
 Creation of awareness on 
conservation of resources 
 Community mobilization 
Legal mandate: initiative taken by 
local community; challenging due to 
need for management plan. 
Semi-formal interaction 
with local government 
though not regular – co- 
management agreement is 
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Kenya Forest Service 
(KFS) maintains 
overall ownership of 
the resource. 
 Reports to KFS through the 
Forest guard  
Recognition in local decision 
making it still limited but is 
envisaged to grow once the signing 
of the formal management plan is 
finalized. 
yet to be finalized to 
provide a formal basis for 
interaction. No formal 
reporting mechanism 
from the CFA to the forest 
guard and limited 
involvement of forest 
guard in CFA meetings. 
 
Irregular and informal 
interactions with other 
local structures – no 
formal platform for 
interaction with other 
local structures. 
Interactions are mostly 
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donor-driven such as 
through capacity building 
workshops and mangrove 
replanting activities 
organized by NGOs. 
Fisheries Beach Management 
Units established 
under the Fisheries 
(Beach Management 
Unit) Regulations of 
2007 and mandated to 
work with the State 
Department of 
Fisheries. 
 Monitoring and Surveillance of 
fish landings 
 Community mobilization 
 Reports to the Fisheries Officer 
Legal mandate: under the State 
Fisheries Department; more 
autonomy and more established than 
the CFA in the same village. 
 
Locally recognized as a key 
decision-making entity especially 
related to access to fisheries. All 
groups working within the fisheries 
sector at the beach are formally 
required to register with a BMU. 
Formal interaction with 
local government and 
regular interaction 
particularly with the 
fisheries officer - formal 
reporting of fish landings 
and regular meetings 
organized. 
 
Irregular and informal 
interactions with other 
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local structures – no 
formal platform for 
interaction with other 
local structures. 
Interactions are mostly 
donor-driven such as 
through capacity building 
workshops and mangrove 
replanting activities 
organized by NGOs. 
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Table 4 Policy, legal and strategic provisions sanctioning community-based natural resource 
management with focus on mangroves and fisheries in Zanzibar 
 
Sector Policy/Act/Plan Provision for community-based and integrated 
management 
Forest National Forest 
Policy of 1995 
 Provides for community engagement in planning,  
management and enfocement through CoFMAs. 
 Conservation and management of mangroves 
within the framework of ICZM. 
 Forest Resources 
Management and 
Conservation Act 
No. 10 of 1996 
 Recognizes and provides guidance for formation 
and operation of CoFMAs and safeguarding 
community rights to plan, manage and share 
benefit from forest resources 
 Mangrove Forest 
Management Plan of 
2010 
 Provides guidance for community particiation 
during development of forest management 
agreements. 
 Develop a programme of integrated coastal area 
management as a collaborative effort among all 
relevant sectors.  
Fisheries Fisheries sub-sector 
Policy under the 
Agricultural Sector 
Policy of 2002 
 Promotion of community participation in 
managing and conserving marine resources. 
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Sector Policy/Act/Plan Provision for community-based and integrated 
management 
 Fisheries Act No. 7 
of 2010. 
 Provides for formation and operationalisation of 
MCU under which regulations SFCs are 
established 
 Regulations for the 
Marine Conservation 
Unit (2013) 
 Provides for engagement of communities as 
primary stakeholders of MCAs in the planning, 
implementation and enforcement through SFCs 
Environment Zanzibar 
Environmental 
Policy 2013  
 The Government will strengthen the 
Environmental Governance and intra- and inter-
sectoral coordination for effective 
environmental practices and law enforcement. 
 Promote and implement Integrated Coastal Zone 
Management System 
 Environmental Management Committees such as 
Climate Change and Integrated Coastal Zone 
Management Committees will be established at 
National, District and Shehia levels 
 The Zanzibar 
Environmental 
Management Act No. 
3 of 2015  
 
 Maintaining basic ecological processes of land, 
water and air 
 Promoting the sustainable use of both renewable 
and non-renewable natural resources 
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Sector Policy/Act/Plan Provision for community-based and integrated 
management 
Local 
Government 
Zanzibar Local 
Government Policy 
of 2014 
 A framework for grassroots initiatives towards 
conservation of natural resources 
 Encouages community mobilization for 
development programmes mainstreaming 
management of natural resources 
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Table 5 Local natural resource governance structures in Zanzibar 
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Sector Mandate Key Responsibilities Level of Formal Authority Level of Interaction with 
other structures 
Local 
Government  
Sheha; District 
Authorities, Sectoral 
District Officers 
(forestry, fisheries) 
with dual devolved 
reporting lines to both 
District Authorities 
and state departments. 
 
 Control access to the resource 
 Enforcement of rules from 
respective line ministries/ 
departments 
 Monitoring and surveillance of 
resources 
 Conflict Resolution 
 
Formally mandated as employees of 
line ministries/ departments 
Shehas are locally recognized as key 
decision makers and reference point 
for all activities undertaken in 
respective Shehia. 
Not well defined, ad hoc 
and issues specific, 
irregular and mostly 
informal 
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Forestry CoFMAs sanctioned 
by the Forest 
Resources 
Management and 
Conservation Act No. 
10 of 1996. The state 
maintains ownership 
of the forest resources 
through DFNR. 
 
 Community mobilization, 
sensitization and awareness 
raising on conservation and 
sustainable utilization of forest 
resources 
 Assist in patrols and law 
enforcement for effective 
management of forest in 
respective areas 
 Reports to designated unit in the 
DFNR. 
Formalized with DFNR but 
challenging due large dependence 
on external financing to effectively 
operate, particularly in development 
of management plans as prerequisite 
for formulation of management 
agreements. 
Recognition in local decision 
making as part of the Shehia’s 
governing body 
 
Motivation for 
establishment is 
overshadowed by donor 
syndrome; with limited 
financial support, 
operations are at stake. 
 
 
Irregular and informal 
interactions with other 
local structures, e.g. SFCs 
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Fisheries SFCs established 
under the MCU 
Regulations of 2013 
and mandated to work 
with the DoFD under 
respective MCAs. 
 
 Monitoring and Surveillance of 
fish landings 
 Community mobilization, 
sensitization and awareness 
raising on sustainable fisheries 
including campaigns against 
illegal and destructive fishing 
activities. 
 Reports to the respective MCA 
Officer 
 
Under respective MCAs, SFCs are 
perceived to be much stronger with 
more autonomy than the CoFMAs in 
the same Shehia. 
 
 
Locally recognized as a key 
decision-making entity especially 
related to access to fisheries. All 
groups working within the fisheries 
sector at the beach are to be register 
with respective SFC in liaison with 
the formally recruited beach 
recorder. 
 
Recognised as part of the 
Shehia’s governing body 
and regular interaction 
particularly with the 
MCA officer in charge 
 
Irregular and informal 
interactions with other 
local structures e.g. 
CoFMAs 
 
